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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Jonathan W. Ellington appeals from his convictions for second degree 
murder and two counts of aggravated battery. During the appellate briefing 
process, the district court denied Ellington's motion for a new trial. Ellington 
raises the denial of his motion for a new trial as a supplemental issue on appeal. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
The statement of facts and course of Ellington's criminal proceedings are 
set forth in the Respondent's brief, filed June 19, 200B. (Respondent's Brief, 
pp.1-5.) 
On June 24, 200B, Ellington filed a motion for a new trial, alleging that he 
had discovered new, material, and exculpatory evidence. (Supp. R., pp.3-7.) 
The Idaho Supreme Court suspended his ongoing appeal to allow the district 
court to decide the motion. (Supp. R., p.B.) 
The particular facts relevant to the issues raised in Ellington's 
supplemental brief are as follows. At trial, the state called Idaho State Police 
reconstruction and accident investigation program manager Fred Rice as a 
rebuttal witness. (Trial Tr., p.1651, L.21 - p.1652, L.22.) Rice rebutted testimony 
of defense witness Dr. William H. Skelton, Jr., regarding average perception and 
reaction times, and the value of crash debris to the reconstruction and incident 
investigation. (Trial Tr., p.1652, L.16 - p.16B2, L.16.) 
In his motion for a new trial, Ellington contended that he obtained new 
evidence that, at trial, Rice had testified inconsistently with testimony he gave 
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during another criminal proceeding, State v. Ciccone, Elmore County Case No. 
CR-2003-4441, two and a half years earlier. 1 (Supp. R., pp.3-7; Appellant's 
supplemental brief, ppA-10; 24-26.) He also submitted documentation indicating 
that Rice's testimony regarding reaction/perception times was inconsistent with 
Idaho State Police training materials that he had authored.2 (R., p.25, 33-34; 
Appellant's supplemental brief, pp.5-13; 24-26.) Ellington contended that this 
inconsistency revealed perjury, and amounted to new, material, and eXCUlpatory 
evidence that warranted a new trial. (Supp R., pp.3-7; See generally, Appellant's 
supplemental brief.) 
After a hearing and briefing by the parties, the district court denied the 
motion, finding that the evidence of Rice's prior inconsistent testimony was not 
material, and that the new evidence would not alter the outcome of a new trial. 
(Supp R., pp.32-46.) Ellington timely appealed, and the Idaho Supreme Court 
1 By order dated December 10, 2009, this Court augmented the Clerk's Record 
with "Defendant's Exhibit A (Transcript of a portion of the trial in State v. Ciccone 
- believed to have been filed on October 17, 2008)", and "Defendant's Exhibit B 
(preliminary hearing transcript from State v. Ciccone, believed to have been filed 
on October 17, 2008)." While these exhibits were never file-stamped by the 
district court, Ellington represents, the record indicates, and the state does not 
contest that they were properly before the court at the time of its consideration of 
Ellington's motion for a new trial. (Supp. R., pp.33, 39; Appellant's supplemental 
brief, pp.6-7; 10/20/08 Tr., p.3, L.15 - pA, L.3.) 
2 By order dated December 10, 2009, this Court augmented the Clerk's Record 
with Defendant's Exhibit D (accident reconstruction training materials - believed 
to have been filed on December 22, 2008). While this exhibit was not file-
stamped by the district court, Ellington represents, the record indicates, and the 
state does not contest that it was properly before the court at the time of its 
consideration of Ellington's motion for a new trial. (Supp. R., pp.25, 33-34; 
Appellant's supplemental brief, p.11; 12/22/08 Notice Of Filing In Support Of 
Defendant's Motion For New Trial.) 
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Ellington states the supplemental issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Ellington's 
motion for a new trial? 
(Appellant's brief, p.15.) 
The state wishes to rephrase the supplemental issue on appeal as: 
Has Ellington failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in 
denying his motion for a new trial? 
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ARGUMENT 
Ellington Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Denying His Motion For A New Trial 
A. Introduction 
Ellington contends that the newly discovered evidence of state rebuttal 
witness Rice's apparently inconsistent testimony in a prior criminal proceeding 
warrants a new trial in this case. (See generally, Appellant's supplemental brief.) 
He also contends that the district court erred by utilizing the four-part Drapeau 
standard in analyzing his motion. (Appellant's supplemental brief, pp.17-24.) 
Because any evidence of Rice's prior inconsistent testimony in the prior 
case is not material to this one, and because the newly obtained evidence would 
not alter the outcome of the trial, Ellington has failed to show that the district 
court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Granting or denying a motion for a new trial is within the district court's 
discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal unless that discretion is abused. 
State v. Jones, 127 Idaho 478, 481, 903 P.2d 67, 70 (1995); State v. Pugsley, 
119 Idaho 62, 63, 803 P.2d 563, 564 (Ct. App. 1991). 
C. Ellington's Argument That Some Standard Other Than The Drapeau Test 
Controls His Motion For A New Trial Is Without Merit 
A defendant may obtain a new trial "[w]hen new evidence is discovered 
material to the defendant, and which he could not with reasonable diligence have 
discovered and produced at the trial." I.C. § 19-2406(7). In State v. Drapeau, 97 
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Idaho 685, 551 P.2d 972 (1976), the Idaho Supreme Court articulated the four-
part test a defendant must satisfy in order to be entitled to a new trial based upon 
newly discovered evidence. That test requires a defendant to show that the 
evidence offered in support of his motion for a new trial (1) is newly discovered 
and was unknown to the defendant at the time of trial; (2) is material, not merely 
cumulative or impeaching; (3) will probably produce an acquittal; and (4) failure 
to leam of the evidence was due to no lack of diligence on the part of the 
defendant. kL. at 691, 551 P.2d at 978; see also Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24, 
30, 995 P.2d 794, 800 (2000). 
In announcing this four-part test, the Court cited Professor Wright's text on 
Federal Practice and Procedure and specifically noted his comment, "after a man 
has had his day in court, and has been fairly tried, there is a proper reluctance to 
give him a second trial." Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691, 551 P.2d at 978 (citation 
omitted). "Motions for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence are 
disfavored and should be granted with caution, reflecting the importance 
accorded to considerations of repose, regularity of decision making, and 
conservation of scarce judicial resources." State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 144, 
191 P .3d 217, 222 (2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (quoting 
State v. Hayes, 144 Idaho 574,577, 165 P.3d 288, 291 (Ct. App. 2007)). 
In the present case, the district court utilized the Drapeau standard in 
denying Ellington's motion for a new trial. (Supp. R., pp.32-46.) Ellington, 
however, argues that the district court erred by not using an alternative test 
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adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Scroggins, 110 Idaho 380, 716 
P.2d 1152 (1985). (Appellant's supplemental brief, pp.16-24.) 
In Scroggins, the defendant claimed that he discovered evidence that the 
only eyewitness at his trial had since recanted his testimony. Scroggins, 110 
Idaho at 384,716 P.2d at 1156. The Idaho Supreme Court relied on a Seventh 
Circuit case, Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82 (th Cir. 1928), in concluding 
that, "in appropriate circumstances, where a defendant submits an affidavit by a 
government witness in which the witness recants his testimony and specifies in 
what ways he dishonestly testified and in what ways he would, if given the 
opportunity to testify again, change that testimony and where a defendant makes 
a showing that such changed testimony may be material to a finding of his guilt 
or innocence, a new trial should be held.,,3 Scroggins, 110 Idaho at 385, 716 
P.2d at 1157. Clearly, such a standard is not applicable in the present case, 
where there has been no recanting, and no affidavit from any government 
witness. 
Further, subsequent to the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Scroggins, 
the Larrison standard it was based on was rejected by the Seventh Circuit, and 
the case itself overruled, in United States v. Mitrione, 357 F.3d 712 (th Cir. 2004) 
(vacated on other grounds by Mitrione v. United States, 543 U.S. 1097 (2005», 
where the court specifically adopted the four part test used in other circuits - the 
3 The Idaho Supreme Court ultimately held that, because the newly discovered 
evidence was subject to multiple inferences, and did not constitute an affidavit, 
the record was too insufficiently developed to permit the Court to conclude that 
the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a new 
trial. Scroggins, 110 Idaho at 385,716 P.2d at 1157. 
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same test adopted from the federal courts in State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 
691,551 P.2d 972, 978 (1976). Mitrione, 357 F.3d at717-18. 
While Scroggins has not been overruled in Idaho, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals has clearly indicated its intent to limit its application to cases in which 
the defense can show that a govemment witness has recanted his trial 
testimony: 
Idaho case law calls for application of the Scroggins/Larrison 
test when a trial witness has recanted his or her trial testimony and 
evidence of that recantation has been presented to the trial court. 
Any other type of new evidence presented by a defendant as an 
alleged basis for a new trial, including other types of proof of 
perjury and evidence of a recantation that has itself been 
subsequently disavowed by the trial witness, are subject to the 
Drapeau test. 
State v. Griffith, 144 Idaho 356, 366, 161 P.3d 675, 685 (Ct. App. 2007) (citations 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
More recently, in State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 191 P.3d 217 (2008), 
the Idaho Supreme court set forth the four-prong Drapeau test in affirming the 
district court's denial of the defendant's motion for a new trial. In Stevens, the 
defendant's "newly discovered evidence" included allegations that one of the 
state's expert witnesses had lied about his credentials during the trial. 1sl at 147, 
191 P.3d at 225. The Court did not reference the Scroggins test. 
Ellington is asking this court to decline to apply the test always applied to 
newly discovered evidence, and to instead create a separate test applicable 
where there is any new evidence of perjury by a government witness. 
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(Appellant's brief, pp.23-24.) However, Ellington has provided no sound basis for 
deviating from the long-established Drapeau test. 
This case simply does not involve a recantation by a material factual 
witness. Scroggins provides no authority for the proposition that Ellington is 
entitled to a new trial without analysis of the materiality of the alleged perjury, its 
probable effects on the trial, and the diligence of the defense in finding the 
evidence that ultimately revealed it. The district court properly analyzed 
Ellington's motion for a new trial under the Drapeau standard. 
D. Ellington Has Shown No Abuse of Discretion In The District Court's 
Application Of The Drapeau Test 
Application of the Drapeau test shows that the district court did not abuse 
its discretion by denying Ellington's motion for a new trial. As determined by the 
district court, the newly discovered evidence in question is not material but is 
instead merely impeaching, and the evidence would not "probably produce an 
acquittal." 
First, from a close review of the context of the challenged testimony, it is 
not even clear that Rice testified inconsistently at the prior unrelated criminal 
proceeding, let alone that he committed perjury. 
At Ellington's trial, defense witness Dr. Skelton, a reconstruction expert, 
explained how the debris from the site of the incident helped to shape his 
opinions regarding the placement of the vehicles during the impact of Ellington's 
Blazer and Jovon and Joleen Larsen's Honda. (Trial Tr., p.1440, L.21 - p.1443, 
L.15.) 
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To rebut Dr. Skelton's testimony, the state called Rice, who testified as 
follows: 
Q. In terms of any of your training, has that focused on 
debris fields? 
A. Yes, sir, that's part of the collision. 
Q. You have had years of training in that regard? 
A. Yes, I have actually crashed vehicles together to see 
what happens during the crash. 
Q. Can you determine, let me ask it this way. How 
precise of an area can you put a collision at by looking at the debris 
field? 
A. Not at all. 
Q. Why is that? 
A. What happens is is [sic] during the collision, parts are 
crunching, glass is breaking. It can strike off of an object, bounce 
off of it, it can go in many different directions. In fact it will absorb 
the speed of another obstruct that it strikes. So basically you know 
an accident happened someplace on that highway. 
Q: Does it have any reliability at all in terms of placing a 
vehicle in one lane as opposed to the next? 
A: No, we would look for the physical evidence. Debris 
can be moved, kicked around, like I said, it sprays. 
(Trial Tr., p.1659, L.18 - p.1660, L.13.) While it is possible to construe Rice's 
testimony as universally discrediting the evidentiary usefulness of incident debris 
(though it would seem unlikely that he would have "years of training" in a field 
that he believes has no evidentiary value), it is equally possible that Rice may 
have been simply highlighting the unreliability of such evidence in this particular 
case, or even when it comes to crash debris' usefulness in placing, generally, "a 
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vehicle in one lane as opposed to the next." This becomes clearer later during 
Rice's testimony: 
Q. In terms of the debris field that we have in this 
particular case, maybe I should get to a photograph that shows it. 
Number 23 has a good view of the debris field. In this 
photograph number 23 there is debris in the eastbound lane, is that 
right? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: Is that any indication of where the actual impact 
occurred. 
MS. TAYLOR: Objection, Your Honor, he has already 
answered the question about debris fields. 
THE COURT: He has. Hopefully his answer will be 
consistent. You can answer the question. 
A: I see a lot of debris all over the road here, it's' not 
going to tell me where the point of impact happened. I see more in 
the westbound than I do in the eastbound. I see some -
MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I'm going to object, he's 
narrative again. 
THE COURT: I think he has answered the question. 
Q: Is there any way at all to put that Honda in the 
eastbound lane based on that debris field? 
MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I'm going to object to that. He 
has talked to him about the debris field and he's getting into 
another theory, should have been brought up in his case in chief if 
he wanted it. 
The COURT: I believe he has already answered that 
question that he can't make that determination. I'll sustain the 
objection. 
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(Trial Tr., p.1672, L.3 - p.1673, L.6.) On cross-examination, defense counsel did 
not inquire about Rice's views about debris fields, either generally, or with 
regards to this case. (Trial Tr., p.1682, L.21 - p.1685, L.7.) 
Previously, at the Ciccone trial, Rice had testified that, in that case, debris 
at the incident scene was more helpful in determining the point of impact: 
Well, we started picking up the glass because the headlight 
was broke. Now, as the vehicle is traveling and the glass is above 
the ground, when it is broke out, it is not going to fall immediately to 
the ground. It is going to continue on at the speed of what that car 
is until gravity pulls it to the ground. So what's going to happen is it 
is going to travel a distance before it actually hits the ground. 
So, we see that the glass is at this point. So, if the 
automobile is traveling at any speed at all, that definitely coincides 
with where the impact point is. 
(Defendant's Exhibit A, p.111 0, Ls.8-20). 
In Ciccone, Rice did not testify that debris fields are a/ways instructive as 
to points of impact, nor did the factual scenario in Ciccone exactly match that of 
the present case. Thus, without a clear explanation for any apparent 
discrepancy in Rice's testimony, it is unclear whether this "newly discovered 
evidence" would even be particularly useful to the defense as impeachment 
evidence. It would be quite a drastic remedy for a district court to invalidate a 
jury verdict and order a new trial in such a scenario. 
At Ellington's trial, defense witness Dr. Skelton also testified that in his 
investigation of the incident, in coming to the conclusion that Ellington did not 
have time to see and react to the Honda before the collision, Dr. Skelton had 
worked with the assumption that it would have taken Ellington three quarters of a 
second to perceive that he was on a collision course with the Honda, and another 
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three quarters of a second to act in response, for a total of one-and-a-half 
seconds. (Trial Tr., p.1424, L.16 - p.1425, L.9; p.1447, L.3 - p.1448, L.3) Dr. 
Skelton explained that "the total perception reaction time is generally accepted as 
1.5 seconds." (Trial Tr., p.1425, Ls.3-5.) 
In rebuttal, Rice testified as follows: 
Q: Dr. Skelton put a 1.5 second reaction perception time 
on the contact between the Blazer to the Honda, do you remember 
that? 
A: I was in the classroom, or in the courtroom for that. 
Q: Is that applicable to this situation? 
A: Absolutely not. 
Q: Why not? 
A: Number 1, there is no average perception reaction 
time in the world. 
MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I'm going to object again, it's 
narrative and it's improper rebuttal. 
THE COURT: I think that response will stand, overrUled, 
continue. 
Q: What do you mean by that? 
A: There is no two people that see things, respond to 
them in the exact same way. You can not [sic] come up with an 
average time. Again, am I looking straight ahead? In the test that 
he talked about coming up with his 1.5 average, was the person 
looking right at the back of the vehicle -
MS. TAYLOR: Objection, narrative. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q: In terms of the perception time from the Blazer 
starting forward to impacting with Mrs. Larsen, again I think he 
talked about the 1.5 figure, does that sound right? 
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A: Sure. 
Q: Is there anything about his assumption that Mr. 
Ellington couldn't have seen Mrs. Larsen that you disagree[?] 
MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I'm going to object, it's improper 
rebuttal. 
THE COURT: Again sustained. 
(TriaITr., p.1679, LA-p1680, L.10.) 
Rice thus did not testify that it is never appropriate for an investigator to 
utilize the one-and-a-half second perception/reaction time. He did express 
disagreement with its use in "this situation," and stated that "there is no average 
perception reaction time in the world." Defense counsel did not further inquire on 
the subject during cross-examination, so the basis of Rice's disagreement is 
unknown, though he did reference his uncertainty with whether Ellington was 
"looking straight ahead" at the time of the impact. 
Previously, during the preliminary hearing of the Ciccone case, Rice 
testified that he had, in fact, utilized three quarters of a second as the reaction 
time when computing a formula during his investigation of that particular case. 
(Defendant's Exhibit B, p.65, L.25 - p.66, L.12.) 
Again, due to the lack of cross-examination on the subject, and Rice's 
limited role as a rebuttal witness, it is unclear from the record why he felt that 
one-and-a-half seconds should not have been used as the perception/reaction 
time in Dr. Skelton's calculations for the Ellington trial, but three-quarters of a 
second was properly used as the reaction time in Ciccone. While such an 
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inconsistency may constitute impeachment evidence, it does not, as Ellington 
contends on appeal, necessarily show false testimony, or perjury. 
While the district court understandably expressed concem with the 
apparent discrepancies of Rice's testimony,4 it properly recognized that evidence 
that Rice testified inconsistently at a prior criminal proceeding is not material to 
Ellington's guilt or innocence - it only potentially impeaches Rice's credibility. 
(Supp. R., pp.39-44.) 
Ellington argues that the evidence is both impeaching and material. 
(Appellant's supplemental brief, pp.32-33.) Even assuming, as Ellington argues, 
that the new evidence would have "tarnished" and "obliterated completely" Rice's 
credibility, the evidence is still only impeaching. While Ellington also contends 
that the "evidence would have done more than call Rice's veracity into question; 
it would have provided substantive support for Dr. Skelton's calculations and 
opinions - all of which pointed to an accident, not a crime," this is an argument 
without merit. (Appellant's supplemental brief, p.33.) 
"Impeachment evidence is offered to attack the credibility of the witness 
rather than to establish the existence or non-existence of a disputed fact." State 
v. Pugsley, 119 Idaho 62,803 P.2d 563 (Ct. App. 1991). That Rice apparently 
testified inconsistently based on different facts at a previous trial does not 
establish the existence or non-existence of any disputed fact, or make Ellington's 
4 However, the district court also noted that it had only "a limited snapshot of the 
inconsistent testimony of Fred Rice and therefore it is difficult to conclude that he 
has intentionally or carelessly attempted to mislead the Ellington jury." (Supp. R., 
p.43.) 
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guilt or innocence more likely. Therefore, evidence of this inconsistency is not 
admissible for any purpose other than impeachment. 
Even if Rice's testimony at Ellington's trial were clearly inconsistent with 
his testimony in Ciccone, Ellington cannot show which proceeding involved false 
or perjured testimony, and which did not. Such a question highlights the potential 
usefulness of the inconsistency as impeachment evidence, but does not indicate 
materiality. The district court properly determined that Ellington did not satisfy 
the materiality prong of the Drapeau test. 
Finally, the district court also properly determined that there was no basis 
to believe that the new evidence would "probably produce an acquittal." (Supp. 
R, pp.44-45.) The district court, who also presided over the original trial, 
questioned the persuasive value of Rice's testimony, noting in a footnote that, 
"[f]rom the perception of the court it is likely that the only one impressed with the 
testimony of Fred Rice was Fred Rice." (R, p.44, fn.6.) The district court also 
noted the highly speculative nature of any impact of the "new evidence," stating 
that in the event of a new trial, "Rice would be given an opportunity to qualify or 
distinguish the perceived inconsistencies in his testimony as it may relate to the 
two cases." (R, p.44.) Finally, the district court recognized that while Ellington, 
in his motion for a new trial, was attempting to focus attention on the split second 
decision prior to the vehicle impacts, there was much more for the jury to 
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consider beyond those seconds, and the respective experts' reconstruction of 
them.5 (Supp. R, pp.41-43.) 
Ellington's claim to a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence 
thus fails on at least two prongs of the applicable standard.6 The proposed 
evidence, at best, constitutes evidence that is merely impeaching, and it would 
not probably produce an acquittal in any new trial. Ellington has failed to show 
that the district court abused its discretion in the denial of his motion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state requests this Court to affirm the district court's denial of 
Ellington's motion for a new trial. 
DATED this 19th day of January 2010. 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
5 The district court explained: "Regardless of the location of the Honda or 
Ellington's ability to perceive and react, his deliberate act of tuming his vehicle 
into harms [sic] way sufficiently demonstrated to the jury the implied malice 
necessary to support the murder verdict. While the disputed evidence relating to 
the motion for a new trial arguably negates any intent initially to commit a battery 
upon the sisters in the Honda, other evidence supports the State's position that 
Ellington persisted with the use of force from his vehicle to drive the Honda out of 
his way." (Supp, R, p.43.) 
6 The district court concluded that Ellington satisfied the other two prongs of the 
Drapeau standard: that the newly discovered evidence was unknown to the 
defense at trial, and that the failure to learn of the evidence was due to no lack of 
diligence on the part of the defendant. (Supp., R, pp.39-40.) 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 19th day of January 2010 served a 
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a 
copy addressed to: 
ERIC R. LEHTINEN 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender'S basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
MWO/pm 
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